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Prior research has established a relation between intra-firm mobility and innovation outcomes at distributed 
organizations. The literature has also uniformly agreed on the mechanism underlying this relationship: the 
sharing of tacit knowledge and recombination of ideas that occurs because of intra-firm mobility. But a 
second mechanism may also be at work: intra-firm mobility might help distant employees secure access to 
resources for their innovative projects. Using unique data on travel, employment, and patenting for 1,315 
inventors at the Indian R&D center of a Fortune 50 multinational, I find that intra-firm mobility in the form 
of short-duration business trips from a distant R&D location to headquarters is positively related to higher 
subsequent patenting at the individual level. I also find mobility immediately prior to meetings at which 
R&D funds are most likely to be disbursed to be related to higher subsequent patenting. This study sheds 
new light on how intra-firm mobility and possible face-to-face interactions with those who allocate 
resources might affect innovation outcomes and the matching of resources to individuals within a 
distributed organization. 
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Fleming, Constance Helfat, Guido Imbens, Samina Karim, William Kerr, Tarun Khanna, Josh Lerner, Dan Levinthal, Lori 
Rosenkopf, Jordan Siegel, Jasjit Singh, Minyuan Zhao, seminar participants at Carnegie Mellon, the Harvard Business School, 
the London Business School, Tufts, and Wharton and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments on a previous draft. The 
author also thanks Katie Moore for editorial help. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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Introduction 
It is well established that mobility is related to innovation outcomes among engineers and scientists 
(Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Agarwal et al., 2004; Agarwal et al., 2009; Singh, 2005; Singh and Agrawal, 
2011). This paper looks at intra-firm mobility, a topic that has received less attention than inter-firm 
mobility. Specifically, I study how mobility within a distributed organization is related to internal resource-
allocation decisions, leading to measurable differences in innovative outcomes at the individual level. 
A nascent literature has documented that intra-firm mobility affects innovation outcomes in a 
distributed organization (Madsen et al., 2003; Singh, 2008; Lahiri, 2010; Karim and Williams, 2012). This 
literature has also singled out a mechanism that could explain why intra-firm mobility is related to 
innovation outcomes in such a context: better diffusion of tacit knowledge via mobility on the part of 
inventors and recombination of knowledge arising from intra-organizational linkages. However, a second 
mechanism could also be at work: intra-firm mobility might help distant employees within a distributed 
firm secure access to resources for their innovative projects, especially if the resources are allocated 
centrally at the headquarters. Arguably, this mechanism has not been emphasized by prior studies linking 
intra-firm mobility and innovation. Given this, my primary research question is the following: does intra-
firm mobility impact innovation outcomes through access to resources?   
Building on the rich literature on internal resource allocation, I identify several sources of 
information asymmetry in the process of matching resources to individuals within a distributed firm. This 
relates to the resource-allocation subprocess known as impetus, i.e. the championing and brokering of 
bottom-up initiatives by middle managers (Bower, 1970; Noda and Bower, 1996; Kuemmerle et al., 2005). 
There can be information asymmetry between frontline employees who work on innovative projects at 
distant locations and the middle managers at headquarters who allocate resources. Distortion and loss of 
information about innovative projects developed by frontline employees at distant locations can also occur. 
The literature has also outlined the possibility that middle managers at headquarters shirk from brokering 
innovative projects developed by frontline employees at distant locations. Geographic distance may also 
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prevent remote frontline employees from developing relational capital at the headquarters and/or might 
constraint them from lobbying for resources. 
Drawing on the prior intra-firm mobility literature and the information processing perspective of 
organizations (Galbraith, 1974; Edström and Galbraith, 1977; Tushman and Nadler, 1978), I posit that intra-
firm mobility helps inventors working at distant R&D locations secure resources for their innovative ideas. 
In my context, intra-firm mobility is defined as short-duration business trips from a distant R&D location 
to the headquarters. Such intra-firm mobility can bring distant inventors face-to-face with those who 
allocate internal resources. It is plausible that, in these meetings, distant inventors make their tacit 
knowledge explicit to the individuals who allocate internal resources. In other words, intra-firm mobility 
and face-to-face interactions can enable inventors from distant locations to share information about their 
ideas, make their tacit ideas explicit, and overcome information asymmetry. Doing so might help such 
inventors secure access to resources for their innovative ideas. A secondary research question relates to 
whether or not intrafirm mobility equally helps all mobile inventors secure resources for their innovative 
ideas or whether there are selection mechanisms at play. 
My empirical context is a Fortune 50 multinational firm, headquartered in the United States, with 
one of its largest R&D centers located in India. Internal resource allocation is centralized at the U.S. 
headquarters. I use unique personnel data on 1,315 inventors who work at the Indian R&D center, including 
employment records, records of travel to the United States, and patent filing data. Following established 
practice in the innovation literature, I use patents as a measure of knowledge creation. My measure of intra-
firm mobility is travel from the Indian R&D center to the U.S. headquarters. Prior studies of mobility (both 
within and across firms) and innovation have often looked for instances of employment and patenting at 
more than one location to infer intra-firm mobility. In contrast, I use airline-ticket data on flights between 
India and the headquarters in the United States to track mobility; this approach enabled me to track the 
mobility of all inventors, regardless of their patenting records prior to and following mobility. Using this 
data, I find that travel to the headquarters is related to an increase in patenting after the inventor returns to 
India.  
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I also find suggestive empirical evidence that intra-firm mobility is positively related to securing 
resources for patenting projects. Using the firm’s calendar for disbursement of R&D funds, I find that travel 
to the United States during crucial months in the R&D disbursement cycle leads to a higher likelihood of 
subsequent patenting. In my empirical context, the timing of inventors traveling to the United States is 
based on the product-launch calendar, which is controlled by U.S.-based product managers. Thus individual 
India-based inventors have relatively little control over when they travel. By exploiting this pattern, I find 
that inventors who travel to the United States in months immediately prior to key R&D funds-allocation 
meetings are more likely to file patents when they return to the Indian R&D center. I also provide evidence 
that suggests that all mobile inventors are equally likely to secure resources for their innovative projects. In 
other words, there seems to be no evidence of selection mechanisms at play.  
This study contributes to the literatures on intra-firm mobility, internal resource allocation, and 
intra-firm organization of innovation. It raises the possibility that an underexplored mechanism shapes 
innovation outcomes at the individual level within distributed organizations. I theorize and provide 
suggestive empirical evidence that intra-firm mobility brings distant inventors into contact with individuals 
who disburse resources and helps such inventors secure access to resources for their innovative projects. 
Due to the limitations of my data, I would not claim causality. Nevertheless, by raising the possibility that 
resource allocation helps explain how intra-firm mobility affects innovation outcomes, this study makes an 
important contribution. My findings also contribute to the literature on global innovation and the expanding 
geography of innovation at multinational firms (MNCs). Since the mid-1990s, numerous MNCs have 
established R&D centers in China, India, and other emerging markets. To quote Gereffi et al. (2008, p. 7), 
“China now boasts nearly 1,000 MNC R&D centers. . . . [I]n India, an estimated 150 of U.S. Fortune 500 
firms had established R&D centers as of 2005.” In the tradition of Zhao (2006), I contribute to the empirical 
literature that has explored innovation outcomes within multinational R&D centers in emerging markets. 
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Theory 
Intra-firm mobility and innovation outcomes within a distributed organization 
An extensive body of research relates inter-firm employee mobility to innovative outcomes (Allen, 1984; 
Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Song et al., 2003; Singh and Agrawal, 2011; Agarwal et al., 2004; Agarwal 
et al., 2009; etc.) In particular, Song et al. (2003) argue that inter-firm mobility does not merely lead to 
transfer of information; it may also facilitate the transfer of capabilities, promoting further knowledge 
building. Singh and Agrawal (2011) estimate that hiring firms increase the adoption of new recruits’ prior 
inventions by 202 percent on average; they attribute much of this effect to the new recruit’s exploitation of 
his/her own prior ideas. A related literature on spin-outs studies mobility among ex-employees of an 
incumbent firm (Agarwal et al., 2004). 
A nascent literature explores intra-firm mobility and innovation outcomes within distributed 
organizations (Madsen et al., 2003; Singh, 2008; Lahiri, 2010; Karim and Williams, 2012).2  Madsen et al. 
(2003) theorize that intra-firm mobility reinforces a firm’s retention of its existing organizing patterns. They 
argue that a firm’s employees share a common language and familiarity with a common set of rules, 
policies, and operating procedures. As a result, intra-firm mobility is likely to reinforce the firm’s existing 
organizing patterns, especially in the case of intra-firm mobility within a country. Singh (2008) studies the 
relation between cross-regional mobility and knowledge flow within a given firm. The author builds on 
prior work on knowledge creation in distributed organizations (Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001; Cummings, 
2004) and argues that inventor mobility leads to cross-regional ties, allowing for a much richer possibility 
of novel combinations of diverse knowledge. In such a distributed R&D context, Singh (2008) shows the 
patented innovations of inventors who move cross-regionally are of greater value than the innovations of 
inventors who do not move, measured by forward citations of patented innovations. The link between intra-
                                                 
2 Leiponen and Helfat (2011) document why firms might engage in distributed R&D. A firm might set up R&D centers in new 
locations to adapt preexisting technological knowledge to local markets, a phenomenon designated by Kuemmerle (1997) as 
“home-base-exploiting” R&D. A firm may also seek to acquire location-specific knowledge (Chung and Alcácer 2002), a 
phenomenon that Kuemmerle (1997) called “home-base-augmenting” R&D. 
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firm mobility and innovative outcomes is, he argues, due to “cross-fertilization of knowledge integration 
that results from mobility” (Singh, 2008; p. 81).  
In a similar vein, Lahiri (2010) shows that, in the context of distributed R&D, intra-organizational 
linkages between R&D units (resulting for example from intra-firm mobility and measured by patents 
coauthored by scientists from different firm locales) influences a firm’s ability to derive benefits from 
broadened geographic scope. The author builds on the information processing perspective of organizations 
and argues that intra-organizational linkages could influence the problem solving ability of individuals by 
increasing both the breadth and depth of knowledge about the existence of expertise within the firm.  Thus, 
firms with intra-organizational linkages, resulting from intra-firm mobility, are more likely to be able to 
share knowledge efficiently across geographically distant locations than firms lacking such intra-
organizational linkages.   
Finally, Karim and Williams (2012) examine whether intra-firm mobility promotes knowledge 
sharing and organizational change. The authors draw on the knowledge-based view of the firm (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Grant, 1996), which asserts that knowledge resides within 
individuals and on Drazin and Rao’s (2002) argument that mobile executives help to transfer knowledge 
within a firm and bring new expertise and experience to the units to which they transfer. They also draw on 
human capital theory (Becker 1964, 1976; Lepak and Snell, 1999) and argue that mobile employees transfer 
tacit, firm-specific knowledge within the firm. The authors conclude that, as employees with specific 
experiences move from one unit of a multidivisional firm to another, they may promote knowledge sharing 
and knowledge creation, often through recombination.  
In summary, prior literature has documented a relation between intra-firm mobility and innovation 
outcomes in a distributed R&D context, and has consistently argued that intra-firm mobility enhances 
innovation outcomes via better diffusion of tacit knowledge and recombination of knowledge.3 
                                                 
3 The broader innovation literature also offers insights into how physical proximity facilitates the transfer of knowledge across 
organizational boundaries. Carlile (2002, 2004) outlines three progressively complex boundaries that hinder the transfer of 
knowledge within organizations — syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic. The same literature also outlines how physical proximity 
can facilitate knowledge transfer. This phenomenon is especially noteworthy at the semantic boundary, which is characterized by 
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A novel mechanism: Intra-firm mobility and access to resources 
This paper argues that a second mechanism may also influence how intra-firm mobility affects 
innovation outcomes in a distributed R&D context: intra-firm mobility may bring distant inventors face-to-
face with the individuals who allocate resources, and thus may help such inventors gain access to resources 
for their innovative projects. Before expanding on this argument, it is important to clarify what I mean by 
‘intra-firm mobility’ in this paper. 
The literature on intra-firm mobility has mostly characterized ‘intra-firm mobility’ as permanent 
moves of employees from one unit to another unit within a distributed firm. Karim and Williams (2012) 
track 885 cases of permanent executive movement from a source unit to a destination unit; Singh (2008) 
characterizes intra-firm mobility as permanent moves of an inventor from one region to another region. 
Lahiri (2010) uses a similar measure of permanent mobility of inventors using patent data. Madsen et al. 
(2003) observe permanent mobility of traders between two rooms over consecutive years. In contrast, in 
this paper, I characterize intra-firm mobility as short-duration, temporary business trips to the 
headquarters, conducted by distant inventors working at a distributed firm. Using this definition, I argue 
that intra-firm mobility helps distant inventors secure resources for their innovative projects, especially if 
the resources are allocated at the headquarters. 
 There is a rich literature on internal resource allocation in strategy—specifically, the Bower-
Burgelman process model of resource allocation within firms (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983). As Noda 
and Bower (2005) argue, the central feature of the model is a process in which bottom-up strategic initiatives 
compete for scarce corporate resources. The Bower-Burgelman model conceptualizes intra-firm resource 
allocation as playing out across three levels of organizational hierarchy: frontline employees, middle 
managers, and top managers. The model also consists of four subprocesses—two interlocking bottom-up 
processes, definition and impetus, and two overlaying corporate processes, structural context determination 
and strategic context determination. 
                                                 
differences among individuals in how knowledge should be interpreted: physical proximity and face-to-face interactions help to 
create “shared meanings” and make tacit knowledge more explicit across the semantic boundary. 
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 Definition is a cognitive process whereby frontline employees develop strategic initiatives based 
on their specific knowledge of technology and/or market forces. Impetus is a sociopolitical process whereby 
these strategic initiatives are persistently championed by frontline employees and brokered by middle 
managers who “put their reputations for good judgment and organizational careers at stake” (Noda and 
Bower, 2005, p. 214). As Bower (1970) explains, top managers do not necessarily possess the knowledge 
or information needed to evaluate the technical and economic aspects of strategic initiatives; consequently, 
they tend to rely on the credibility of their middle-manager sponsors to make resource-allocation decisions. 
Therefore, as Noda and Bower (2005) assert, strategic initiatives emerge primarily from the managerial 
activities of frontline employees and middle managers.4 
 Extending the theory of internal resource allocation to a distributed organization, Kuemmerle et al. 
(2005) trace how the context of a distributed firm can create information asymmetries and/or inefficiencies 
when matching resources and individuals. A key source of information asymmetry relates to the fact that 
“ideas get intercepted and do not ‘bubble up’ from the front line of management to the top of the firm” 
(Kuemmerle et al., 2005, p. 184); the authors invoke an agency argument to explain why strategic initiatives 
defined by frontline employees in a distributed organization might not bubble up to middle managers. In 
other words, for a distributed organization, there might be several sources of information asymmetry that 
affect the subprocess that the Bower-Burgelman resource-allocation model calls impetus. First, given that 
the knowledge possessed by frontline employees of new technology and/or market forces is often tacit and 
non-codifiable, there could be information asymmetry between remote frontline employees and the middle 
managers at headquarters who need to broker the strategic initiatives defined by such frontline employees. 
Second, a distributed organization is likely to have more layers of organizational hierarchy and more formal 
communication channels than a non-distributed organization. In this environment, strategic initiatives 
                                                 
4 Nonetheless, top managers exercise critical influence on these activities by setting up the structural context—that is, the 
organizational and administrative mechanisms, including the information and measurement systems, incentive system, and 
organizational architecture. By shaping the structural context to reflect corporate objectives, top managers influence the context 
in which the decisions and actions of frontline employees and middle managers are made. The chosen strategic initiatives lead, in 
turn, to refinement or change in corporate strategy, thus determining the strategic context over time. 
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defined by distant frontline employees could get distorted in transmission, or even fail to reach relevant 
middle managers and top managers at headquarters. Third, even if the strategic initiatives defined by distant 
frontline employees reach middle managers at headquarters, and those middle managers fully understand 
such ideas, they might shirk from brokering such initiatives, given their inability to consistently monitor 
distant frontline employees. From the perspective of the Bower and Burgelman model, in a distributed 
organization, inefficiencies in the internal structural context can lead to imperfect information systems. 
Such inefficiencies can also create an environment more preoccupied with punishing failure than with 
rewarding success; in such an environment, middle managers might maximize their private benefits by 
choosing to broker and adopt initiatives characterized by low uncertainty, which are likely to be those closer 
to headquarters rather than at distant foreign locations.5 
It is conceivable that intra-firm mobility brings frontline employees based in distant locations into 
contact with the middle managers who are in a position to broker and champion their ideas.  Intra-firm 
mobility and face-to-face interactions with middle managers at the headquarters might help distant front-
line employees share information about their innovative ideas, make their tacit ideas explicit, and overcome 
the information asymmetry related to their ideas. Face-to-face interactions could also help middle managers 
get better acquainted with distant frontline employees, thus alleviating unease about their ability to monitor 
such employees. Such interactions might also help frontline employees more fully understand what middle 
and top managers are looking for. In other words, using language from the Bower and Burgelman model, 
intra-firm mobility could help frontline employees better understand the strategic context of the firm, 
enabling them to adapt their future innovative projects to what middle and top managers want.  
This set of insights is related to the information processing perspective of organizations (Galbraith, 
1974; Edström and Galbraith, 1977; Tushman and Nadler, 1978) and the importance of face-to-face 
interactions in transmitting verbal information related to innovative projects. Edström and Galbraith (1977) 
argue that intra-firm mobility is an effective way of designing a ‘verbal information system’ within a 
                                                 
5 A related body of research (e.g., Hornstein and Zhao 2011) in the broader economics and finance literature examines how intra-
firm constraints prompt firms to make less-than-efficient capital budgeting decisions. 
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distributed firm. They state that in a distributed organization, such as a multinational firm, the intra-firm 
information system works as a two-step process. In the first step, new, strategic and ambiguous information 
is collected at the subsidiaries; in the second step, such information is often transmitted verbally to the 
headquarters. They also build on prior researchers, such as Mintzberg and Weick, to argue that, for a 
distributed firm, verbal information is not equally distributed across all units of the firm. Hence, one of the 
main challenges in a distributed organization is the ‘equalization of verbal information’ across all units 
within the firm. The authors state that intra-firm mobility is an effective way of integrating managers into 
the verbal information networks.6 Extending their insights, one could argue that intra-firm mobility 
integrates employees into verbal information networks within the firm, which might help resolve 
information asymmetry between the middle managers and distant frontline employees. This might help 
distant frontline employees secure resources for their innovative projects. 
Face-to-face interactions can also help distant frontline employees develop relational capital vis-a-
vis middle managers at the headquarters. A rich literature in strategy builds on Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) 
and documents that employee mobility can help create relational capital of individuals (Somaya et al. 2008; 
Mawdsley and Somaya, 2015). In a recent study, Byun et al. (2016) show that in the US lobbying industry, 
relational capital helps lobbyists gain revenue when their political connections gain power. In the case of 
the distributed R&D organization, intra-firm mobility could help build all dimensions of relational capital 
for the distant yet mobile inventor, but could particularly strengthen the normative (relational) dimension, 
that relates to reciprocity, obligations, and mutual trust that might facilitate transactions between individuals 
(Kale et al., 2000). In addition, intrafirm mobility might also help frontline employees lobby for resources.7   
Drawing on a collective set of insights from the literature in strategy and innovation, I hypothesize 
that access to resources is a mechanism that links intra-firm mobility and innovation outcomes. 
                                                 
6 There is a more recent literature on the importance of face-to-face meetings and spontaneous verbal communication for 
distributed organizations (Hinds and Bailey 2003, Hinds and Mortensen 2005). This literature has argued that face-to-face 
meetings and spontaneous communication helps build shared context and shared identity for employees working in a distributed 
organization. This helps reduce interpersonal conflict and task conflict for distributed teams. 
7 There is an extensive literature in strategy and economics on lobbying for resources. In a recent paper, Bertrand et al. (2014) 
show that lobbyists’ personal contacts to key stakeholders are a relevant asset in defining their job. An excellent summary of this 
literature is provided by de Figueiredo and Richter (2013). 
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A related and secondary theoretical question relates to whether or not intrafirm mobility equally 
helps all mobile inventors secure resources for their innovative ideas or whether there are selection 
mechanisms at play. Selection mechanisms such as quality of the inventor or the quality of the underlying 
innovation could determine which inventors travel within the firm. On the other hand, if intra-firm mobility 
is not related to the focal project or is unrelated to the quality of underlying inventor/innovation, all 
inventors could have an equal likelihood of traveling within the firm and all mobile inventors could have a 
chance to secure resources for their innovative ideas. 
 
The Empirical Context 
TechMNC: Allocation of Resources for Patentable Ideas  
TechMNC is a U.S.-based Fortune 50 technology company that established its Indian R&D center in the 
late 1990s. The center, incubated by a group of 12 returnee employees from the U.S. headquarters, grew 
steadily over the next decade to more than 1,300 employees.  
In keeping with several prior studies in the strategy and innovation literature, I used patenting as a 
measure of knowledge creation.8 I also followed the established tradition of fieldwork inside firms by 
initially conducting interviews with all senior managers and a sample of mid- and entry-level employees at 
TechMNC’s India R&D center. These interviews generated several insights into the patenting process and 
the process of allocating funds for patentable ideas. 
First of all, individual inventors need resources to pursue their patentable ideas. In addition, at 
TechMNC, patent filing is a budget-constrained process. Though the actual cost of filing a patent is 
moderate, investment in inventor man-hours during the pre-patenting stage, when a patentable idea is being 
developed by the inventor, is often significant. Typically, local inventors at the Indian R&D center also 
require funding from a global product manager at TechMNC’s U.S. headquarters to develop the patentable 
idea or proof of concept.  
                                                 
8 Treating patenting as my measure of knowledge creation offers an advantage: because all patent counts in this case pertain to the 
same firm, several sources of firm-level heterogeneity, such as R&D efficiency and patenting propensity, are held constant. 
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Second, the R&D funds needed for patenting at TechMNC are centralized at the U.S. headquarters. 
That is, funds for patenting and for support of pre-patent development of an idea are exclusively controlled 
by the U.S.-based product managers. Argyres and Silverman (2004) argue that centralizing R&D funding 
can be beneficial in that it minimizes ambiguity about a firm’s R&D objectives. At TechMNC, product 
managers are not engineers or scientists; they are typically MBA graduates, responsible for providing 
strategic direction to the product development teams. Product managers review patentable ideas from 
around the world and fund ideas that match their “strategic priorities” for the product they manage. The 
U.S.-based product managers have the discretion to invest in patentable ideas from within their own product 
teams and in ideas proposed by inventors from other product teams. My interviews with a sample of the 
product managers revealed their support for centralizing R&D funds. To quote a U.S. product manager, 
“Centralizing R&D funds helps us focus on investing in ideas that are important for the product. If the 
inventors in China, India, or the U.K. had their own R&D budgets, they might pursue ideas that are 
technologically great but a complete misfit for our product strategy.” 
 To understand the timetable for disbursement of R&D funds at TechMNC, I also interviewed the 
head of its India R&D center, the patent lawyer responsible for filing U.S. patents on behalf of Indian 
inventors at TechMNC, and two Indian inventors who had filed U.S. patents. TechMNC adhered to a July-
to-June fiscal cycle, with quarters beginning in July, October, January, and April. Inventors working on 
patentable ideas submitted their proposals prior to quarterly business review (QBR) meetings in July 
(beginning of Q1), October (Q2), January (Q3), and April (Q4). Indian inventors, like inventors at other 
R&D locations, submitted their proposals online; the proposals were available to all U.S. TechMNC product 
managers. All product managers, as well as managers from finance, strategy, and other functional groups, 
attended the QBR meetings. The main purpose of the QBR was to review product group performance for 
the prior quarter. Product managers also presented the list of innovative ideas to which they would be 
allocating resources. The list of innovative ideas that would receive resources was chosen by the product 
manager prior to the meeting and this decision was at the discretion of the product manager alone. Often 
the list of ideas that would receive funding was presented in summary slides during the QBR presentations 
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and was handed over by the product managers to managers from finance for actual disbursement of funds. 
Individual inventors had to submit separate and often customized proposals to each product manager from 
whom they were seeking resources. Proposals not funded at an earlier meeting were not automatically 
reconsidered at the next meeting.  
 The first QBR meeting was held in July. The main activities of this meeting were to review the 
prior fiscal year and to set targets along various performance indicators for the new fiscal year. Another 
activity of the July QBR was to set the R&D budget for each product group. While setting the budget for 
the new fiscal year, the fraction of the prior year’s budget that was spent was taken into consideration. If 
some of the prior year’s funds were left unspent, the budget for the new fiscal year could be negatively 
impacted.  
 My interviews also revealed significant variation in the resources allocated to support patentable 
ideas among the four QBR meetings. Few funds were allocated to new patentable ideas at the July meeting. 
By contrast, about one-fourth of funds to support patentable ideas were allocated during the second QBR, 
held in October. This was the first big chance for inventors to receive resources for their innovative projects. 
Disbursement of funds to support patentable ideas was lowest at the third QBR meeting, held in January, 
when many product managers had just returned from vacation and had not had time to review patentable 
ideas. In the words of several inventors I interviewed, the fourth and final QBR meeting, held in April, was 
the inventors’ “best chance” to get funds for patentable ideas. My interviews suggested that product 
managers allocated a disproportionately large fraction (40–50 percent, anecdotally) of funds for patentable 
ideas at the April QBR. They did so because product managers who had not fully allocated their funds to 
patentable projects by the end of the fiscal year risked losing the unspent funds the following year (that is, 
their budgetary allocation of funds could be lower in the subsequent year if they did not fully allocate the 
balance of funds at the April QBR). My interviews also suggested that inventors around the world knew 
this to be the case; thus, numerous proposals were submitted in the weeks leading up to the April QBR. 
“April is a key month for inventors seeking resources for their patentable ideas at TechMNC,” one inventor 
explained. “All the product managers are giving away money to support good ideas, but everyone is 
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scrambling to meet them during lunch or during the day to discuss their idea or show the proof of concept 
or flowchart they have been working on. It’s like a beauty contest for patentable ideas.” According to my 
interviews, inventors who submitted proposals online often received e-mails from product managers 
immediately prior to the April QBR requesting a face-to-face meeting to clarify their ideas or a “demo” of 
their proof of concept. A similar but less intense process was also underway prior to the October QBR 
meeting, where 25 percent of the funds were allocated. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the calendar for disbursement of R&D funds at TechMNC. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
According to interviews, the patentable ideas that Indian inventors submit are often unrelated to 
their day-to-day projects. Their assigned projects entail writing code for software products; their patentable 
ideas typically involve generic technologies of potential relevance to multiple product teams. TechMNC is 
a software firm; the inventors who work for it have day jobs consisting of writing software code, testing 
code, fixing bugs, or providing support to external teams that employ a TechMNC software product. The 
typical day job also focuses on a specific software product, such as the operating-system product or the 
database product. By contrast, the patents that these employees file typically involve methods, systems, and 
architecture that could be applicable to multiple current or future software products and/or computing 
devices (e.g., laptops, mobile phones, etc.). Inventors may draw ideas from their own or others’ day-to-day 
projects, from their own or others’ research at TechMNC, or from their own research during graduate 
school. For example, I interviewed an inventor in India, a member of the e-mail product team, who came 
up with a proof of concept involving speech-recognition technology. The product manager of the e-mail 
product team decided that speech-based e-mail was not a strategic priority for that product; a request to 
fund the proof of concept was thus turned down. Months later, however, the inventor received funding for 
the proof of concept from the gaming-console product team, whose product manager saw speech- 
recognition as a core competence for that team. In fact, many patentable ideas were ultimately funded by 
an organizational unit other than the inventor’s own group. In 2010, 55 percent of funded ideas submitted 
by inventors at the Indian R&D center received support from a product group other than the inventor’s own 
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group. 9 See the Appendix for two more motivating examples of inventors who received funding for their 
patentable ideas and an explication of how intra-firm mobility facilitated the funding process. 
All patents filed by the Indian R&D center are U.S. patents. TechMNC’s team of patent lawyers is 
located in the United States, and all patents are filed with the USPTO first, even if a piece of technology is 
developed outside the United States and used worldwide. As deemed necessary, the U.S.-based patenting 
team may decide to file family patents in other countries. 
 
TechMNC: Travel to the U.S Headquarters and Patenting  
My interviews also shed light on why Indian inventors traveled to the United States and on the nature of 
those trips. Product development at TechMNC is modularized, and Indian inventors typically work on sub-
modules of larger products being developed in the United States.10 Most Indian inventors who travel to the 
United States do so to integrate their sub-modules into the final products; most of this integration work 
occurs prior to the launch of new product versions. Among the members of the Indian project teams, the 
specific inventor who developed code for the sub-module being integrated was selected to travel to the 
United States. For example, the inventor who developed the application program interface (API) of the sub-
module being integrated and tested went to the U.S. headquarters prior to the product launch. Thus, in most 
cases, the local manager did not make the selection based on ability or other considerations. Moreover, my 
interviews suggest that the timing of product launches is typically driven by external events, such as the 
timing of a competitor’s product release, the timing of major conferences and user-group meetings, U.S. 
and other countries’ holidays, and the like. These patterns imply that travel is plausibly uncorrelated to 
observable measures of ability. The average duration of each of these trips was about 11 weeks. All my 
travel data is for the years 2006 and 2007. 
 
                                                 
9 According to managers I interviewed, this figure is representative of overall funding patterns over time. 
10 This pattern of modularized product development is as predicted by Zhao (2006), who asserts that multinationals develop 
intellectual property in countries with weak intellectual property (IP) protection. 
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Data and Methods 
Data and Variables 
I collected employment, travel, and patenting data, as well as other information about all inventors on the 
payroll of the Indian subsidiary of TechMNC as of December 2007, yielding a cross-sectional dataset of 
1,315 inventors. The data was collected from multiple internal sources and needed considerable cleaning 
and coding. The travel data, for example, consisted of 2,593 travel records listing the codes of source and 
destination airports, travel dates, and passenger names. 
 Table 1 summarizes inventors’ employment and personnel records; Table 2 presents data on travel 
and patenting. I collected monthly travel records for two years (2006 and 2007), patent filings for five years 
(2004–2008), and patent grants for 14 years (1994–2007). The main dependent variable is the number of 
patents filed between the years 2006–2008 (patents filed 0608). The mean number of patents filed from 
2006 to 2008 is 0.18.  I also code whether or not an inventor filed at least one patent from 2006 to 2008 
(has filed patent 0608) and 9 percent of the inventors filed at least one patent in that period. I use the period 
from 2006 to 2008 as the years of patent filing because these are the years during or before which travel is 
observed. I also code how frequently an inventor traveled to headquarters. Here, I used both a dummy 
variable (has traveled to headquarters) and a count measure (number of trips to headquarters). In 2006–
2007, 26 percent of the inventors made at least one trip to headquarters. 
 The main individual-level control variables pertain to tenure, whether or not the inventor is a return 
migrant or returnee, and the organizational (product) group to which the inventor belongs. I controlled for 
tenure because inventors with more tenure could have better access to individuals with knowledge and/or 
resources. In the data I received from TechMNC, each employee at TechMNC belonged to one of six tenure 
categories: less than one year, one to two years, two to four years, four to six years, six to ten years, and 
over ten years. I also controlled for organizational group, on the grounds that employees in certain groups 
could have a higher propensity to file patents and/or secure resources. Each employee at TechMNC’s Indian 
R&D center belonged to one of six organizational (product) groups, each focused on a particular product 
portfolio: Client, Server and Tools, Business Solutions, Entertainment Devices, Online Services Business, 
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and Corporate. I controlled for employees’ returnee status (is returnee) to account for selection—that is, 
returnees might have disproportionately higher rates of intra-firm mobility and/or ability to secure 
resources. Of the total population of inventors, about 8 percent were returnees. In robustness checks, I 
considered additional control variables, such as job title, size of the patenting team, patenting by the 
inventor’s manager, ethnic ties between the manager and the employee, and the like. 11 
   [TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Methods 
My two empirical tests focus on validating two theoretical propositions: that intra-firm mobility is related 
to innovation outcomes, and that access to resources is the mechanism whereby intra-firm mobility 
influences innovation outcomes. 
 First, following prior literature (e.g. Singh, 2008; Lahiri, 2010), I test whether intra-firm mobility 
is positively related to innovation outcomes, specifically to the number of patents filed. Using fine-grained 
travel data based on airline-ticket records, in the base case I run the following specification: 
 
1) 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 0608𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝛽2 × 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽3 ×
𝑜𝑟𝑔 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽4 × 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖 
 In the base case, I use panel data and run an individual fixed effects and random effects model. In 
robustness tests, I also run regressions using cross-sectional data and employ three specifications: an OLS 
model with robust standard errors, a weighted quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) Poisson specification, 
and a ZINB specification. 
 Second, I test whether access to resources is a mechanism that links intra-firm mobility and 
innovation outcomes. This test is based on two assumptions – (i) securing resources is correlated to 
                                                 
11 Following Blundell et al. (1995), I also controlled for the pre-sample average innovation count, using prior patent grants, and a 
dummy to indicate a zero value of pre-sample innovation activity. 
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innovative outcomes12 and (ii) intra-firm mobility, i.e. traveling to the headquarters, prior to the April and/or 
October QBR meetings is correlated to securing resources.13 If both of these assumptions hold, then one 
would see a positive relation between traveling to the headquarters prior to the April and/or October QBR 
and innovative outcomes, i.e. patenting. To implement this test, I employ a specification where patenting 
is the dependent variable and the independent variables relate to the timing of travel to the headquarters.  
 In the base case, I considered three-month travel windows prior to each QBR meeting. In robustness 
checks, I also considered two-month travel windows prior to each QBR meeting. I did not consider a longer 
window prior to the QBR because the average trip to headquarters by an Indian inventor lasts around 11 
weeks. Moreover an inventor traveling to headquarters four or more months prior to a key resource-
allocation QBR would presumably have had a chance to submit a funding proposal to a prior QBR (given 
that the QBRs take place every three months). Considering a four-, five-, or six-month travel window prior 
to the QBR might thus lead to measurement issues. 
 Also, the timing of travel to headquarters depends on the product launch date, which is driven by 
external factors; it is likely that individual inventors cannot manipulate the timing of travel. I considered 
only inventors who made a single trip to headquarters from 2006 to 2007, and analyzed whether the timing 
of travel was related to the probability of filing a patent. The specification is: 
2) 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑 0608𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙 𝑄𝐵𝑅  
+ 𝛽2 × 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐽𝑢𝑙𝑦 𝑄𝐵𝑅 
+ 𝛽3 × 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑂𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝐵𝑅 +  𝛽4 × 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖+𝛽5 × 𝑜𝑟𝑔 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 +
 𝛽6 × 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑖  
For example, the dummy variable 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 𝑎𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙 𝑄𝐵𝑅 is coded 1 if an 
Indian inventor traveled to headquarters in February, March, or April, and 0 otherwise. I am particularly 
                                                 
12 Here I draw on the Bower Burgelman model and the contextual fact described earlier, that inventors at TechMNC need 
resources to pursue their patentable ideas.  
13 Given the resource-allocation schedule described earlier, the probability of securing resources should be higher if an Indian 
inventor traveled to the headquarters in April (described as the “best chance” to secure funding) or one or two months prior to the 
April QBR, when around 50 percent of the funds were allocated. There should also be a positive relation between securing 
resources and traveling to the headquarters prior to the October QBR, when around 25 percent of the funds were allocated. 
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interested in determining whether the coefficients for the three month travel window prior to the April QBR 
meeting and the October QBR meeting are positive and significant.14 Given that travel prior to the April 
and October QBR is likely to be correlated to securing resources, this would be evidence suggestive of the 
mechanism related to securing access to resources through intra-firm mobility.  
    
Results 
I first present results based on the test outlined in specification 1, which proposes that intra-firm mobility 
is positively related to innovation outcomes, i.e. the number of patents filed by individual inventors. Table 
3 presents results from the baseline inventor fixed effects and random effects models; the dependent 
variable here is patents filed 0608. In summary, travel to headquarters has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on patenting for inventors based at distant locations within a distributed organization. The 
result is robust to controlling for tenure, organizational group, and returnee status of the individual. When 
I decomposed the overall travel variable into dummies for different numbers of trips, I found that the result 
is driven by the first trip to headquarters. Controlling for the first trip, subsequent trips do not lead to any 
incremental effect on patenting. (These results are available from the author.) 
   [TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
  
Next I present results of the test based on specification 2.  This test proposes that intra-firm mobility is 
positively related to access to resources. I hypothesized that the probability of securing R&D funds would 
be higher if an Indian inventor had traveled to the United States during or shortly before the April QBR 
and/or the October QBR. The results, presented in Table 4, support this proposition. 
Across all the specifications shown in Table 4, there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between traveling to the United States during or immediately prior to April and the probability 
                                                 
14 In the base case, the omitted three-month window for travel is November, December and January, when travel from India to 
headquarters is almost nonexistent. I also ran robustness checks with other three-month windows as the omitted period. Here, I ran 
an OLS with robust standard errors model and other models, including quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) Poisson and logit (using 
has filed patent 0608 as the dependent variable). 
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of subsequently filing a patent. To recap, the largest tranche of funds (~50%) are allocated prior to the April 
QBR meeting. The coefficient for the ‘three month travel window around October QBR’ variable is also 
significant and this relates to the fact that the second largest tranche of funds (~25% of the funds) are 
allocated prior to the October meeting. Moreover, the magnitude of the coefficient for the April QBR 
variable is larger compared to the coefficient for the October QBR variable across all specifications. This 
is related to the fact that the largest fraction of funds are allocated in April, followed by October.  
The coefficient for the ‘three month travel window around July QBR’ is not significant. To recap, 
very little funds (~15%) are allocated prior to the July meeting. In all these specifications, the missing 
baseline period is the January QBR, when travel is minimal. I consider a three-month window of travel 
prior to each QBR meeting; in robustness checks, I also consider a two-month window of travel, and the 
results remain robust. For results presented in Table 4, I used a different measure of patenting and 
considered the variable has filed patent 0608 as the dependent variable; the results are more restrictive 
(results available with author). In this alternate specification, only the coefficient for the ‘three month travel 
window around April QBR’ variable is positive and statistically significant (p<0.10). I also looked for 
confounding patterns in the distribution of travel and found none.15 In summary, across all specifications, 
travel prior to the April QBR, where 50% of the funds are allocated has a positive and statistically 
significant relation to innovation outcomes. This suggests that access to resources is the mechanism that 
links intra-firm mobility and innovation outcomes. 
   [Table 4 ABOUT HERE] 
I also conducted analyses to tease out whether selection mechanisms are at play and find no 
evidence that better quality inventors are more likely to travel and thus enjoy superior access to resources. 
First, I used airline ticket price data to study whether there were systematic differences in ticket prices for 
inventors traveling prior to the crucial April and October QBRs, compared to inventors traveling prior to 
                                                 
15 The distribution of travel by month is as follows: January 6%, February 3%, March 4%, April 13%, May 6%, June 12%, July 
7%, August 16%, September 12%, October 13%, November 8%, and December 0%. Only 20 percent of travel took place in the 
three-month window prior to the April QBR. I also analyzed whether more business-class travel took place in some quarters and 
found no such evidence. This finding lays to rest the possibility that more senior inventors were traveling to headquarters prior to 
crucial funds-disbursement meetings. 
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the July and October QBRs. It is plausible that the firm rewards better quality inventors with travel using 
business class tickets and such travel happens prior to the crucial April and October QBRs. However, I find 
no such evidence. Second, I compared quality of innovation (measured using total forward citations and 
self forward citations) for mobile and non-mobile distant employees. Total forward citations for patents 
filed by distant inventors who traveled and by those who did not travel were 1.81 and 2.29 respectively; 
self-forward citations were 0.66 and 0.00 respectively. These differences are not statistically significant. 
 
Additional Robustness Checks 
I conducted robustness checks to validate the results presented in Table 3 that demonstrated a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between travelling to the headquarters and subsequent patenting. It is 
conceivable that inventors of higher ability travel more frequently to the U.S. headquarters, and, 
independent of their travel, file more patents. To account for such possible endogeneity, I used an 
instrumental variable (IV) test. My IV strategy is based on two realities. First, most travel took place prior 
to the global launch of a new version of a product, and the individual Indian inventor had relatively little 
control over the travel dates. Second, though the purpose of the inventor’s travel was to integrate a sub-
module into a global product, the innovative tacit ideas he/she broached during the trip were typically 
unrelated to that work. I used the product launch date as an instrument for traveling to the U.S. headquarters. 
The probability of U.S. travel is correlated with a global product release; the timing of that event is, 
plausibly, uncorrelated to measures of the ability of individual inventors. I created a variable, product 
launch, as follows: for 48 product teams at TechMNC, I collected data on whether or not a product launch 
took place in 2006, 2007, 2008, or 2009. I then determined the dates of the global product launch and the 
beta launch, when available. For each inventor, I coded the variable product launch as 1 if a beta launch 
occurred during his/her years of the travel (2006, 2007) and/or if a final product launch occurred in 2007, 
2008, or 2009, i.e., within two years of travel. Of the 48 product teams, 17 experienced new product 
launches in this time period. Results of the IV test (available from the author) validate all results reported 
using individual fixed effects and random effects models reported in Table 3. Also, a key assumption of 
22 
 
this IV test is that inventors’ travel to headquarters was for reasons unrelated to their patenting. If at least 
some of their travel was related to knowledge creation, my IV results may be driven by selection. I cannot 
rule out this possibility and use the IV test only as a robustness check.  
 For Table 3, I used a different measure of patenting, and considered the variable has filed patent 
0608 (dummy set to 1 if the inventor filed one or more patents in 2006 to 2008) as the dependent variable, 
and got similar results. I also replicated my results with cross-sectional data and several alternate 
specifications (Poisson with QML robust standard errors, ZINB, and OLS with robust standard errors) and 
got similar results.   
 
Discussion 
This study establishes a positive and statistically significant relation between intra-firm mobility and 
innovative outcomes (patenting) for distant inventors within a distributed R&D organization. I find that 
travel to the U.S. headquarters leads to a higher likelihood of patenting by Indian inventors. I estimate the 
odds ratio to be around 2.16 I also find that the effect of travel is entirely driven by the first trip to 
headquarters; subsequent trips do not have any incremental effect on patenting. My results also suggest a 
positive and statistically significant relation between intra-firm mobility and acquisition of resources for 
innovative projects pursued by distant inventors who travel to the headquarters. I find evidence that intra-
firm mobility during and immediately prior to April and October, when most of the resources for patentable 
ideas are allocated at headquarters, is related to subsequent patenting. I estimate the odds ratio for travel 
around April (i.e. three month travel window around April QBR) to be 4.9. 
 
Contributions 
By examining intra-firm mobility as a mechanism for matching resources to individuals in a distributed 
organization, my results contribute to the nascent literature on intra-firm mobility. Intra-firm mobility has 
                                                 
16 The odds ratio is 2.4 when the model is specified without controls. In the fully specified model, the odds ratio is 2.1. 
23 
 
received scant attention, in keeping with the fact that the intra-firm organization of innovation is itself a 
relatively new area of study. As Argyres and Silverman (2004, p. 929) note, “Over the last 15 years or so, 
. . . academic research has focused on the inter-firm organization of R&D activities—specifically, the role 
of alliances and networks—almost to the exclusion of intra-firm organization.” The comprehensive review 
of employee mobility and organizational outcomes by Mawdsley and Somaya (2015) has no mention of the 
topic of intrafirm mobility. Scholars of the nascent literature on intra-firm mobility and intra-organizational 
linkages such as Madsen et al. (2003), Singh (2008), Lahiri (2010), and Karim and Williams (2012) have 
discussed how intra-firm mobility can promote sharing of tacit knowledge and recombination of ideas. I 
develop reasoning for why such mobility can promote better access to resources and thus innovative 
outcomes at the individual level. My explication of the mechanism that governs access to resources is a 
novel contribution to the literature on intra-firm mobility. I also provide evidence that suggests that access 
to resources is a mechanism that affects all traveling employees equally, i.e. there is no evidence of selection 
mechanisms at play. 
Another novelty of my work is its attention to temporary and short-duration intra-firm mobility, rather 
than permanent relocation within the firm as described by Madsen et al. (2003), Singh (2008), Lahiri (2010) 
and Karim and Williams (2012). My results show that temporary relocation, even for a few weeks, can have 
longer-term effects on innovation. This insight also has implications for the broader literature in strategy 
and international business focused on expatriate movements within multinational firms (Tung, 1998; 
Mezias and Scandura, 2005). Such intra-firm mobility is often temporary, but the duration of such mobility 
is often measured in years, not weeks. 
I also make a methodological contribution to the literature on employee mobility. Prior researchers 
have typically measured employee mobility (both within and across firms) by looking for instances in which 
an inventor was employed at more than one location and patented at both locations. A shortcoming of this 
methodology is that it overlooks the mobility of inventors who patent at only one of the two locations and 
that of inventors who do not patent at all. To quote Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003, p. 758):  
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Use of inventors’ patent trajectories limits our ability to identify mobility in two ways. 
First, if a scientist moves from one firm (the source) to another (the recipient) and only 
patents at the recipient, we cannot record mobility. . . . [W]e also cannot record mobility 
when a mobile scientist only patents at the source firm, which might lead us to overestimate 
the effect of mobility. Because there are no comprehensive databases that track inter-firm 
mobility during our study period, we are unable to avoid these types of errors.  
In contrast, I examined actual travel data to track mobility, which enabled me to identify mobility for all 
inventors regardless of their patenting records. My study is also in line with Singh’s (2008) call for “more 
in-depth study of individual firms” (Singh 2008, p. 93) to enrich the literature of intra-firm mobility and 
innovation. 
Additionally, my results contribute to the literature on firms’ internal resource allocation. This literature 
has barely begun to explore impediments to efficient matching of resources and individuals in a distributed 
organization, or the mechanisms that could alleviate such impediments. For example, this literature has not 
explored the implications of frontline employees’ geographic remoteness from middle and top managers in 
distributed organizations. Geographic distance between frontline employees and middle managers is likely 
to negatively affect the “interlocking” nature of the two bottom-up processes, definition and impetus, that 
the original theory framework envisaged. I pinpoint several sources of information asymmetry and 
inefficiencies likely to characterize impetus in a distributed organization where middle managers fail to 
champion ideas submitted by distant frontline employees.  
My results also contribute to the strategy and international-business literature on the expanding 
geography of innovation within the multinational firm (MNC). That literature has documented that 
multinational firms exist because of their ability to transfer and exploit knowledge more effectively and 
efficiently in an intra-firm context than via external market mechanisms (Caves, 1971). As Gupta and 
Govindarajan (2000) point out, the internalization-of-intangible-assets argument, originally advanced by 
Hymer (1960), has been subjected to numerous confirmatory empirical tests and is now widely accepted as 
“received theory” on why MNCs exist. But MNCs face several challenges when conducting R&D across 
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multiple locations. As Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) note, the effective transfer of capabilities from one 
location to another is hampered by impediments to acquisition of internal resources. This scenario might 
lead certain subsidiaries to become “isolated” from the MNC’s knowledge-creation activities (Monteiro et 
al., 2008). Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008) also document how subsidiaries gain attention from the 
headquarters using subsidiary level constructs such as ‘weight’ (structural positions that subsidiaries occupy 
within the multinational firm) and ‘voice’ (initiative taking). I contribute to this literature by showing how 
intra-firm mobility at the individual level might help distant subsidiaries secure resources from the 
headquarters. This might also prevent such subsidiaries from becoming isolated entities within the MNC. 
A related stream of literature in strategy and international business, starting with Edström and Galbraith 
(1977) and Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), has focused on transfers of personnel as a mechanism to manage 
knowledge within the multinational firm. But no prior empirical studies have used personnel data and travel 
data to test whether the transfer of personnel within a multinational firm is related to knowledge creation at 
geographically distant subsidiaries.17  
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
My study has several limitations. Because I studied a single-firm setting, external validity is a reasonable 
concern; further analysis is needed before the results can be generalized to a broader set of firms across a 
broader set of markets. Also, the firm I study engages in distributed innovation, but centralizes resource 
allocation at the U.S. headquarters. Future work could explore settings where both innovation and resource 
allocation are distributed, and others where both are centralized, to arrive at a more generalizable set of 
conclusions. Also, though there is a long tradition in the innovation literature of using patents as the measure 
                                                 
17 There is also a literature starting with Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) on the evolution of capabilities in multinational subsidiaries. 
During my field interviews I came across examples of how certain teams within TechMNC India leveraged their initial success in 
securing resources for a ‘pilot’ innovation project to subsequently scale up capabilities within the same product team. An example 
of such a team was the visual studio devices team that initially secured resources to work on small pilot projects related to hotfixes 
and service packs. The success of the initial pilots led to further resource acquisition related to future innovation projects around 
the core API model, programmable security configuration, and enhancements to the device emulator. Future research could explore 
the role of intra-firm mobility and securing resources for pilot projects as a driver of repeated acquisition of resources and 
subsequent development of the capabilities at the subsidiary.    
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of knowledge creation, future work should consider other plausible measures. Finally, my data are limited 
in that I do not observe actual resource-allocation decisions and must impute them using the resource-
allocation calendar and the travel schedules of individual inventors.  
My main mechanism i.e., access to resources, is a reflective mechanism and is reflective of formative 
indicators such as information asymmetry resolution, or relational capital building or lobbying efforts. 
Future work could unpack this reflective mechanism and focus on empirically teasing out the core formative 
indicators.18 There is also a possibility that the ideas of distant inventors lucky enough to travel to 
headquarters crowd out the better-quality ideas of distant inventors who stay put. To test this hypothesis, 
one would have to compare the quality of patents filed by the two groups of inventors – i.e. the distant 
inventors who travel to the headquarters and the distant inventors who do not travel to the headquarters. As 
discussed earlier, I attempted to compare the quality of patents granted to distant inventors who had traveled 
to those granted to inventors who had not traveled, using forward citations as the measure of quality. I did 
not find any statistically significant differences in either total forward citations or self-forward citations. 
Future work could further explore this possibility. However, even this possibility of crowding out does not 
take away the fact that intra-firm mobility could indeed alleviate certain information asymmetries in the 
internal resource-allocation process of impetus for a distributed firm. Revealed preference of the 
headquarters-based product managers suggests that the innovative ideas of distant inventors who traveled 
to the headquarters that were funded, were plausibly of higher quality than ideas proposed by local inventors 
based at the headquarters that were not funded. It is plausible that without intra-firm mobility, the same 
ideas of distant inventors who traveled to the headquarters would not have been funded. 
Also, a key assumption of this study is that inventors’ travel to headquarters was for reasons 
unrelated to their patenting. If at least some of their travel was related to knowledge creation, my results 
may be driven by selection. I cannot rule out this possibility. 
                                                 
18 I would like to thank the editor and an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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Finally, though I interpret my results as evidence that intra-firm mobility helps distant inventors 
secure resources, it is also plausible that such mobility enables distant inventors to share information about 
their innovative ideas, and that doing so leads to knowledge recombination and/or new collaborations that 
generate further knowledge building (Song et al., 2001; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). I do not rule out this 
possibility and view the two mechanisms (i.e. sharing of tacit knowledge/recombination of knowledge and 
securing resources) as complementary mechanisms. However, a few facts are worth stating. First, the focal 
visit is brief (around 11 weeks) and temporary. To recap, in prior papers, intra-firm mobility relates to 
permanent within-firm moves. I also compared backward and self-backward citations of patents filed by 
distant inventors who traveled to patents filed by distant inventors who did not travel and did not find any 
statistically significant differences. Finally, I also compared the average number of headquarter 
collaborators on patents for distant inventors who traveled and distant inventors who did not travel and do 
not find and statistically significant differences.19 If traveling to headquarters led to knowledge 
recombination, self-backward citation rates and the number of collaborators from the headquarters should 
have been higher for patents filed by distant inventors who traveled, but that is not the case. Thus the 
observed effect may plausibly be attributed to the ability of those inventors to secure resources. But I cannot 
rule out the possibility of knowledge recombination during the focal visit. 
I would have liked to establish causality, but because my data are imperfect, I cannot fully do so. 
By raising the possibility that resource allocation is an important explanatory mechanism behind how intra-
firm mobility affects innovation outcomes, this study nevertheless makes an important contribution. This 
insight has managerial implications for internal resource allocation at multinational firms and at 
multilocation single-country firms. The consistency of the findings across multiple approaches appears to 
point toward an underlying causal relationship, though establishing it conclusively will have to await future 
research. 
                                                 
19 Total backward citations for patents filed by distant inventors who traveled and by those who did not travel were 46.59 and 32.71 
respectively; self-backward citations were 6.69 and 3.71 respectively. These differences are not statistically significant. The number 
of headquarters based collaborators on patents filed by distant inventors who traveled and distant inventors who did not travel were 
1.43 and 1.39 on average. These differences are not statistically significant. 
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In conclusion, my study theorized and found evidence that intrafirm mobility impacts innovation 
outcomes through a novel mechanism – access to resources. The evidence also suggests that this mechanism 
affects all traveling inventors equally, i.e. there is no evidence of selection mechanisms at play. The study 
draws new attention to intrafirm mobility, a topic that has received far less attention compared to interfirm 
mobility. Unlike prior literature that categorizes employee mobility as permanent moves within or across 
firms, the study also sheds new light on the importance of short-duration, temporary business trips by distant 
employees. Such temporary and short-duration trips might be instrumental in integrating distant employees 
within a distributed organization. My study reveals promising pathways for continued research in the 
context of organizations engaged in geographic expansion and is also relevant for organizations engaged in 
telecommuting of employees.20  
 
  
                                                 
20 There is a nascent literature that looks at the impact of telecommuting and working from home. Notable papers include 
Kurland and Egan (1999), Thatcher and Zhu (2006) and Bloom et al. (2014). 
29 
 
References 
 
Agarwal, R., R. Echambadi, A. M. Franco, M. B. Sarkar. 2004. Knowledge transfer through inheritance: 
Spin-out generation, development, and survival. Acad. Management J. 47(4) 501–522. 
Agarwal, R., M. Ganco, R. H. Ziedonis. 2009. Reputations for toughness in patent enforcement: 
Implications for knowledge spillovers via inventor mobility. Strategic Management J. 30(13) 1349–
1374. 
Allen, T. J. 1984. Managing the flow of technology. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Almeida, P., B. Kogut. 1999. Localization of knowledge and the mobility of engineers in regional 
networks. Management Sci. 45(7) 905–917. 
Argyres, N. S., B. S. Silverman. 2004. R&D, organization structure, and the development of corporate 
technological knowledge. Strategic Management J. 25(8‐9) 929–958. 
Bartlett, C. A., S. Ghoshal. 1989. Managing across borders: The transnational solution. Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
Becker, G. S. Human capital. Columbia University Press, New York, NY. 
Becker, G. S. 1976. The economics approach to human behaviour. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
IL. 
Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi. "Is it whom you know or what you 
know? An empirical assessment of the lobbying process." The American Economic Review 104.12 
(2014): 3885-3920. 
Birkinshaw, J., N. Hood. 1998. Multinational subsidiary evolution: Capability and charter change in 
foreign-owned subsidiary companies. Acad. of Management Rev. 23.4 773-795. 
Bloom, N., Liang, J., Roberts, J., and Zhichun Jenny Ying. Does Working from Home Work? Evidence 
from a Chinese Experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2014. doi:10.1093/qje/qju032 
Blundell, R., R. Griffith, J. Van Reenen. 1995. Dynamic count data models of technological innovation. 
Econom. J. 105(429) 333–334. 
Bower, J.L. 1970. Managing the resource allocation process: A study of corporate planning and 
investment. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
Bouquet, C., J. Birkinshaw. 2008. Weight versus voice: How foreign subsidiaries gain attention from 
corporate headquarters. Acad. of Management J. 51.3 577-601. 
Burgelman, R. A. 1983. A process model of internal corporate venturing in the diversified major firm. 
Admin. Sci. Quart. 28(2) 223–244. 
Byun H., Frake J., Agarwal R. Leveraging who you know by what you know: returns to relational and 
human capital. Working paper, 2016. 
Carlile, P. R. 2002. A pragmatic view of knowledge and boundaries: Boundary objects in new product 
development. Organ. Sci. 13(4) 442–455. 
Carlile, P. R. 2004. Transferring, translating, and transforming: An integrative framework for managing 
knowledge across boundaries. Organ. Sci. 15(5) 555–568. 
Caves, R. E. 1971 International corporations: The industrial economics of foreign investment. Economica 
38(149) 1–27. 
Chung, W., Alcácer, J. 2002 Knowledge seeking and location choice of foreign direct investment in the 
United States. Management Sci. 48(12) 1534–1554. 
Cohen, W. M., D. A. Levinthal. 1990. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and 
innovation. Admin. Sci. Quart. 128-152. 
Cummings, Jonathon N. "Work groups, structural diversity, and knowledge sharing in a global 
organization." Management science 50.3 (2004): 352-364. 
De Figueiredo, John M., and Brian Kelleher Richter. Advancing the empirical research on lobbying. No. 
w19698. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013. 
30 
 
Drazin, R., H. Rao. 2002. Harnessing managerial knowledge to implement product-line extensions: how 
do mutual fund families allocate portfolio managers to old and new funds? Acad. of Management J. 
45.3 609-619. 
Edström, A., J. R. Galbraith. 1977. Transfer of managers as a coordination and control strategy in 
multinational organizations. Admin. Sci. Quart. 22(2) 248–263. 
Galbraith, J. R. 1974. Organization design: An information processing view. Interfaces 4.3 28-36. 
Gereffi, G., V. Wadhwa, B. Rissing, R. Ong, 2008. Getting the numbers right: International engineering 
education in the United States, China, and India. J. Engineering Edu. 97(1) 13–25. 
Grant, R. M. 1996. Toward a knowledge‐based theory of the firm. Strategic Management J. 17.S2 109-
122. 
Gupta, A. K., V. Govindarajan. 2000. Knowledge flows within multinational corporations. Strategic 
Management J. 21(4) 473–496. 
Hinds, P. J., D. E. Bailey. 2003. Out of sight, out of sync: Understanding conflict in distributed teams. 
Organ. Sci. 14.6 615-632. 
Hinds, P. J., M. Mortensen. 2005. Understanding conflict in geographically distributed teams: The 
moderating effects of shared identity, shared context, and spontaneous communication. Organ. Sci. 
16.3 290-307. 
Hornstein, A. S., M. Zhao. 2011. Corporate capital budgeting decisions and information sharing. J. 
Econom. & Management Strategy 20(4) 1135–1170. 
Hymer, S. 1976. The International Operations of National Firms: A Study of Direct Foreign Investment. 
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Jaffe, A.B., M. Trajtenberg, R. Henderson. 1993. Geographic localization of knowledge spillovers as 
evidenced by patent citations. Quart. J. Econom. 108(3) 577–598. 
Kale, Prashant, Harbir Singh, and Howard Perlmutter. "Learning and protection of proprietary assets in 
strategic alliances: Building relational capital." Strategic management journal 21.3 (2000): 217-237. 
Karim, S., C. Williams. 2012. Structural knowledge: How executive experience with structural 
composition affects intra-firm mobility and unit reconfiguration. Strategic Management J. 33(6) 681–
709.  
Kogut, B., U. Zander. 1992. Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the replication of 
technology. Organ. Sci. 3.3 383-397. 
Kuemmerle, W. 1997. Building effective R&D capabilities abroad. Harvard Bus. Rev. 75(2) 61–70. 
Kuemmerle, W., J. L. Bower, C. G. Gilbert. 2005. The process of international expansion: Comparing 
established firms and entrepreneurial start-ups. J. L. Bower, C. G. Gilbert, eds. From Resource 
Allocation to Strategy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 176–204. 
Kurland, Nancy B., and Terri D. Egan. "Telecommuting: Justice and control in the virtual organization." 
Organization Science 10.4 (1999): 500-513. 
Lahiri, N. 2010. Geographic distribution of R&D activity: how does it affect innovation quality? Acad. of 
Management J. 53.5 1194-1209. 
Leiponen, A., C. E. Helfat. 2011. Location, decentralization, and knowledge sources for innovation. 
Organ. Sci. 22(3) 641–658. 
Lepak, D. P., S. A. Snell. 1999. The human resource architecture: Toward a theory of human capital 
allocation and development. Acad. of Management Rev. 24.1 31-48. 
Madsen, T. L., E. Mosakowski, S. Zaheer. 2003. Knowledge retention and personnel mobility: The 
nondisruptive effects of inflows of experience. Organ. Sci. 14(2) 173–191. 
Mawdsley, John K., and Deepak Somaya. "Employee mobility and organizational outcomes an 
integrative conceptual framework and research agenda." Journal of Management (2015): 
0149206315616459. 
Mezias, J. M., T. A. Scandura. 2005. A needs-driven approach to expatriate adjustment and career 
development: A multiple mentoring perspective. J. of Internat. Business Studies. 36.5 519-538. 
Monteiro, L.F., N. Arvidsson, J. Birkinshaw. 2008. Knowledge flows within multinational corporations: 
Explaining subsidiary isolation and its performance implications. Organ. Sci. 19(1) 90–107. 
31 
 
Nahapiet, Janine, and Sumantra Ghoshal. "Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational 
advantage." Academy of management review 23.2 (1998): 242-266. 
Noda, T., J. L. Bower. 1996. Strategy making as iterated processes of resource allocation. Strategic 
Management J. 17(S1) 159–192. 
Noda, T., J. L. Bower. 2005. Strategy making as an iterated process of resource allocation. J. L. Bower, C. 
G. Gilbert, eds. From Resource Allocation to Strategy. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 213–
268. 
Reagans, Ray, and Ezra W. Zuckerman. "Networks, diversity, and productivity: The social capital of 
corporate R&D teams." Organization science 12.4 (2001): 502-517. 
Rosenkopf, L., P. Almeida. 2003. Overcoming local search through alliances and mobility. Management 
Sci. 49(6) 751–766. 
Rosenkopf, L., A. Nerkar. 2001. Beyond local search: Boundary‐spanning, exploration, and impact in the 
optical disk industry. Strategic Management J. 22(4) 287–306. 
Singh, J. 2005. Collaborative networks as determinants of knowledge diffusion patterns. Management Sci. 
51(5) 756–770. 
Singh, J. 2008. Distributed R&D, cross-regional knowledge integration and quality of innovative output. 
Research Policy. 37.1 77-96. 
Singh, J., A. Agrawal. 2011. Recruiting for ideas: A difference-in-differences approach for estimating the 
effect of mobility on access to an inventor's prior knowledge. Management Sci. 57(1) 129–150. 
Song, J., Almeida, P., G. Wu. 2001. Mobility of engineers and cross-border knowledge building: The 
technological catching-up case of Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor firms. R. A. Burgelman, H. 
Chesbrough eds. Comparative Studies of Technological Evolution. Emerald Group, Bingley, UK, 59–
84. 
Song, J., P. Almeida, G. Wu. 2003. Learning by hiring: When is mobility more likely to facilitate inter-
firm knowledge transfer? Management Sci. 49(4) 351–365. 
Thatcher, Sherry MB, and Xiumei Zhu. "Changing identities in a changing workplace: Identification, 
identity enactment, self-verification, and telecommuting." Academy of Management Review 31.4 
(2006): 1076-1088. 
Tung, R. L. 1998. American expatriates abroad: From neophytes to cosmopolitans. J. of World Business. 
33.2 125-144. 
Tushman, M. L., D. A. Nadler. 1978. Information Processing as an integrating concept in organizational 
design. Acad. of Management Rev. 3.3 613-624. 
Zhao, M. 2006. Conducting R&D in countries with weak intellectual property rights protection. 
Management Sci. 52(8) 1185–1199.  
32 
 
Table 1     Summary Statistics of Employment and Personnel Records 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
fraction tenure < 1 year 1,202 0.25 0.43 0 1 
fraction tenure = 1-2 years 1,202 0.34 0.47 0 1 
fraction tenure = 2-4 years 1,202 0.28 0.45 0 1 
fraction tenure = 4-6 years 1,202 0.04 0.20 0 1 
fraction tenure = 6-10 years 1,202 0.06 0.24 0 1 
fraction tenure >10 years 1,202 0.03 0.18 0 1 
fraction jobtitle = business 1,315 0.01 0.11 0 1 
fraction jobtitle = other IT 1,315 0.05 0.22 0 1 
fraction jobtitle = software 1,315 0.41 0.49 0 1 
fraction jobtitle = program mgmt 1,315 0.11 0.31 0 1 
fraction jobtitle = testing 1,315 0.33 0.47 0 1 
fraction org grp1 1,202 0.28 0.45 0 1 
fraction org grp2 1202 0.06 0.23 0 1 
fraction org grp3 1,202 0.07 0.25 0 1 
fraction org grp4 1,202 0.15 0.35 0 1 
fraction org grp5 1,202 0.08 0.26 0 1 
fraction org grp6 1,202 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Is returnee 1,315 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Manager is returnee 1,118 0.33 0.47 0 1 
returnee_tenure_at_subsidiary (years) 104 2.44 2.05 0 10 
Notes. This data was collected from multiple sources within TechMNC. Tenure, job title, and 
organizational-group data for individual employees were collected from personnel records. 
Returnee status and returnee relocation data was collected from HR.  
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Table 2     Summary Statistics of Travel and Patenting Records 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Has traveled to headquarters 1,315 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Number of trips to headquarters 1,315 0.40 0.85 0 7 
patents filed 0608 1,315 0.18 0.81 0 15 
has filed patent 0608 1,315 0.09 0.28 0 1 
patents_filed_2004 1,315 0.01 0.17 0 5 
patents_filed_2005 1,315 0.01 0.09 0 2 
patents_filed_2006 1,315 0.05 0.30 0 3 
patents_filed_2007 1,315 0.10 0.54 0 11 
patents_filed_2008 1,315 0.04 0.25 0 3 
patents_granted_1994 1,315 0.00 0.03 0 1 
patents_granted_1995 1,315 0.00 0.10 0 3 
patents_granted_1996 1,315 0.00 0.08 0 2 
patents_granted_1997 1,315 0.01 0.18 0 5 
patents_granted_1998 1,315 0.01 0.24 0 7 
patents_granted_1999 1,315 0.00 0.06 0 1 
patents_granted_2000 1,315 0.01 0.12 0 3 
patents_granted_2001 1,315 0.00 0.09 0 3 
patents_granted_2002 1,315 0.02 0.23 0 6 
patents_granted_2003 1,315 0.01 0.10 0 2 
patents_granted_2004 1,315 0.01 0.12 0 3 
patents_granted_2005 1,315 0.01 0.14 0 3 
patents_granted_2006 1,315 0.02 0.20 0 4 
patents_granted_2007 1,315 0.01 0.08 0 2 
Notes. This data was collected from multiple sources within TechMNC. Data on patent grants and 
patent filing was collected from the intellectual-property management group. Data on employee 
travel was collected from the travel desk. This data consisted of a list of employees’ trips, including 
dates of travel and airport codes. I merged this data with personnel records using employee names 
and counted trips to headquarters and other locations using airport codes. 
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Table 3     Regression Results: Travel to Headquarters and Patenting  
 Dependent variable: patents filed 0608 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Has traveled to 
headquarters 
0.104*** 
(0.014) 
0.097*** 
(0.011) 
0.101*** 
(0.012) 
0.091*** 
(0.012) 
0.093*** 
(0.012) 
Dummies for tenure No No No Yes Yes 
Dummies for org groups No No Yes No Yes 
Control for returnee status No Yes No No Yes 
Model 
Fixed 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
Random 
effects 
N 1,315 1,315 1,202 1,202 1,202 
Notes. This table tests whether travel to headquarters is related to higher patenting. This test, based on 
specification 1, examines the proposition established by prior researchers (e.g., Singh 2008, Lahiri 2010) 
that intra-firm mobility is related to innovation outcomes. In my data, travel is for the years 2006 and 2007. 
I use panel data and individual fixed effects (column 1) and random effects (columns 2-5).  The results 
indicate a positive and highly statistically significant relation between travel to HQ and patenting. In 
robustness checks, I also use cross-sectional data and employ a weighted quasi-maximum likelihood 
(QML) Poisson specification, a ZINB specification, OLS with robust standard errors, and a different 
dependent variable (has filed patent 0608), and get similar results. I replicate the results using a different 
independent variable for headquarters travel and use the variable number of trips to headquarters. I get 
similar results. I control for whether or not the employee is a returnee, for tenure, and for the organizational 
group to which the employee belongs. *Denotes significance at the 10% level; **Denotes significance at 
the 5% level; ***Denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4      Regression Results: Month of Travel to Headquarters and Patenting 
  Dependent variable: patents filed 0608 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
three month travel window 
around April QBR  
0.477*** 
(0.180) 
0.477*** 
(0.177) 
0.479** 
(0.185) 
0.363** 
(0.181) 
0.366** 
(0.182) 
three month travel window 
around Oct QBR  
0.382** 
(0.156) 
0.382** 
(0.154) 
0.299** 
(0.132) 
0.282* 
(0.144) 
0.279** 
(0.138) 
three month travel window 
around July QBR  
0.044 
(0.104) 
0.044 
(0.105) 
0.022 
(0.105) 
-0.024 
(0.115) 
-0.027 
(0.117) 
Dummies for year of travel No Yes No No Yes 
Dummies for returnee status No No Yes No Yes 
Dummies for tenure No No No Yes Yes 
Control for org groups Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 238 238 238 238 238 
Notes. This table regresses the month of travel to headquarters to the probability of subsequent patenting. 
This test is based on specification 2 and relates to the proposition that intra-firm mobility is related to access 
to resources. Across all specifications in Table 4, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between travel to the United States during or prior to April (when around 50% of the funds are allocated) 
and the probability of subsequently filing a patent. There is also a positive and statistically significant relation 
between travel prior to October (when around 25% funds are allocated) and the probability of subsequently 
filing a patent. Here, I ran an OLS with robust standard errors model and in robustness checks, I run other 
models, including quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) Poisson and logit (using has filed patent 0608 as the 
dependent variable). This table documents results of considering a three-month window of travel (during 
the QBR month or one/two months prior). All models compare travel prior to the QBRs in April, October, 
and July to the baseline period in January when travel is minimal. I also ran a robustness check (not 
reported) with a two-month window of travel; the results remain robust. I report three-month travel window 
results given that the average trip is around 11 weeks. I considered only inventors who made a single trip 
to the United States in 2006–2007. The resulting sample size is 238 trips; if I had considered all inventors, 
including those who made multiple trips, the total would be 522 trips.  I ran a robustness check with the 
alternate dependent variable (has filed patent 0608), and the results are more restrictive. In this alternate 
specification, the coefficient for only the ‘three month travel window around April QBR’ variable is positive 
and statistically significant (p<0.10). *Denotes significance at the 10% level; **Denotes significance at the 
5% level; ***Denotes significance at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Figure 1 R&D Fund Disbursement Calendar at TechMNC 
 
  Start of fiscal year 
                                       Q1                              Q2                                   Q3                      Q4 
 | | | | | | | | | | | | 
 July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June 
             
         
             
Meeting date July QBR   Oct QBR   Jan QBR   Apr QBR   
             
Key activities 
Review of prior 
financial year 
  
Review of Q1 
performance 
  
Review of Q2 
performance 
  
Review of Q3 
performance 
  
 
Setting of 
performance 
indicators for next 
year 
  
Allocation of 
resources to 
patentable ideas 
(“first chance” to 
get funds) 
     
Allocation of 
resources to 
patentable ideas 
(“big chance” to get 
funds) 
  
 
Setting of R&D 
funding budget            
             
Resource 
allocation 
Low     Medium     Low     Very High 
    
  
                
  
Product managers try 
to allocate funds to 
exhaust R&D funding 
  
  
Percentage of 
funds allocated* 
~15%     ~25%     ~10%     ~50%     
Note.    *These rough estimates are based on interviews with managers 
